In many parts of the world, and particularly in the EU, the Scandinavian welfare-state model has been celebrated and looked upon with envy. However, the upcoming Swedish election in September will radically change the political realities. The two big traditional adversaries – the Social Democrats and the right-wing Moderates – are bleeding, like their smaller counterparts, to the Sweden Democrats (SD), a populist party opposed to immigration. There is a strong argument that immigration is one of the main driving forces behind the increased support for SD. The focus in this pre-election analysis by Sten Widmalm, professor in Political Science at Uppsala University, is instead on causes that go further back in time. According to the hypothesis presented here, the most recent wave of immigrants has sooner been a trigger. The underlying cause is what has happened to the welfare state in Sweden – or, more correctly, with what the prevailing economism has replaced the welfare state with. A system once built to support its citizens may appear to have turned against them. From this perspective, the new economistic system is a predator. It takes more than it gives back.
On 9 September, political realities in Sweden’s parliament are expected to change dramatically. The Greens and the Christian Democrats, for starters, may both fall below the threshold for parliamentary representation. Perhaps it is their versions of identity politics which are failing. However, the two big traditional adversaries – the Social Democrats and the right-wing Moderates – are not gaining from this. They are bleeding, like their smaller counterparts, to the Sweden Democrats (SD), a populist party opposed to immigration. Most polls now show SD as the third largest party; some show it as the second. Sweden is obviously becoming more like the other EU member states. We have become integrated into the Union and its political structures. And this is what we asked for when we voted to join in the 1990s – although, most likely, a large number of Swedes expected the EU would become more like Sweden if only Sweden did it the favour of joining. Apparently, being an EU member means adjusting to a political culture with more popular and influential populist parties than we have traditionally had in Sweden. And now the traditional left-vs-right ‘block’ division of Swedish politics has been joined by other types of division, which do not follow the traditional fault lines.
However, it should be pointed out that it was in 1991 – before Sweden joined the EU – that a populist anti-immigrant party (Ny Demokrati) first got into parliament. However, the big difference between SD and other populist parties with a general aversion to immigration and high taxes – like Ny Demokratior similar parties in Norway and Denmark – is that SD has its roots in neo-Nazism. How did Sweden get here? How did a party with such roots become so popular in a relatively short time? Has SD gained support by prompting Swedes to dig deeply into their souls, where they have discovered and embraced their inner Nazi selves?
Some probably have. In the 1930s and 1940s, after all, Sweden did not exactly cover itself with glory. Since then, however, the people of this country have demonstrated high levels of political tolerance, as well as uniquely strong support for keeping the country’s borders relatively open to immigration. All the same, it is hardly unreasonable to see the growing support for SD as resulting from two large immigration waves – one in the 1990s from the former Yugoslavia, and then an even larger one in 2015–2016.
As a proportion of its population, moreover, Sweden took in more refugees than any other EU member state – at least during the autumn of 2015. 160,000 persons sought asylum in Sweden in 2015, and the total number of those who have done so over the last four years is around 300,000. The population of Sweden, it bears recalling, is ten million. The country’s politicians simply lost control of the situation for a while, when they first declared the borders would stay open, after which they made a U-turn and implemented the strictest border controls in the EU. Integrating the latest wave of newcomers has been difficult.
The immigrants who came in the 1990s were relatively well-educated, and they proved successful at finding work and integrating into Swedish society. Many who came in the last wave face greater difficulties. Large numbers grew up in camps on their way from Syria and Afghanistan. Some, from various countries in Africa, have had little or even no formal education. They land hard here and become segregated rather than integrated. And the costs for the state of this wave of immigration are high. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Sweden Democrats are cashing in on this today. Even some immigrants concur with SD that Sweden’s immigration policy has been too open. SD is growing rapidly among Swedes with an immigrant background – including women.
A kind of micro-clash of civilizations seems to be going on in Sweden.
There is a strong argument, then, that immigration is one of the main driving forces behind the increased support for SD. But the pattern in Sweden differs from that in the US or the UK, for example. In the former country, namely, negative attitudes towards immigration stretch well beyond the uneducated and marginalized. Markus Uvell concludes, on the basis of survey data, that pessimistic attitudes (including on immigration) are to be found among broader segments of the population in Sweden than in many other countries, including among voters who traditionally favour the larger parties on the left and right. A kind of micro-clash of civilizations seems to be going on in Sweden. The established parties are finding it hard to handle a substantial conservative current within their own ranks – a current that rejects both some forms of feminism and liberal rules on immigration. Unfortunately, however, the climate of debate in Sweden is far from constructive on such issues. In the respectable organs of opinion, namely, conservative views on these questions are stigmatized. It is rare, therefore, to find them honestly presented or straightforwardly debated.
In any case – and leaving some of the findings about the climate of debate in Sweden aside – we need to ask: is the sheer number of immigrants the reason why SD is gaining support and the traditional parties are losing out? Uvell’s results indicate that SD and its campaigns are just one among several different factors that must be considered. My focus here is on causes that go further back in time. According to the hypothesis presented here, the most recent wave of immigrants has sooner been a trigger. The underlying cause is what has happened to the welfare state in Sweden – or, more correctly, with what the prevailing economism has replaced the welfare state with. These questions naturally interact with immigration issues. However, we need to look at what has happened with the welfare state if we are to understand the context in which immigrants have arrived. From one perspective, Swedes may seem to be penny-pinchers who refuse to share their growing wealth with those in greatest need of a portion thereof. From another angle, however, a system once built to support its citizens may appear to have turned against them. From this perspective, the new economistic system is a predator. It takes more than it gives back.
The denial of time and care to those who most need it illustrates something in the simplest of ways (and there are much worse ways too, unfortunately): the end of what was once known as the welfare state in Sweden.
Is this a welfare state?
Sweden. Late winter. It’s an election year. In an elder-care facility in Uppsala, a trainee receives a strong reprimand for having shared a cup of coffee with one of the residents. She is now told that sitting down with the residents and talking to them – and worst of all, sharing a cup of coffee with one of them! – allocates scarce resources ‘inefficiently’ and thus ‘incorrectly’. In one of the richest countries in the world, there is no time for a chat and a cup of coffee at the home for elderly people – people who, when they were part of the workforce, paid the world’s highest taxes. This simple cup of coffee symbolizes an important paradigm shift here. The denial of time and care to those who most need it illustrates something in the simplest of ways (and there are much worse ways too, unfortunately): the end of what was once known as the welfare state in Sweden. Why was such a welfare model, celebrated across the world, abandoned? Did populism kill off the welfare state? Did the parties opposing the Social Democrats do it in? Or – the most fantastic hypothesis of all – did the Social Democrats themselves do in their famous creation, thus at least paving the way for SD?
In many parts of the world, and particularly in the EU, the Scandinavian welfare-state model has been celebrated and looked upon with envy – especially by advocates of left-of-centre policies, as well as by social scientists. For the former, it has offered an example of progressive equality and social security that has managed to garner support from a wide range of parties and constituencies. The latter have been fascinated by the fact that the public administration in charge of the Scandinavian welfare project has managed for so long to avoid the pitfalls of corruption and clientelism. Francis Fukuyama, historian and author a few years back of The End of History and the Last Man, has been so impressed that he once suggested that the whole world watch the Scandinavians, in order to learn how to build and sustain liberal democracy. However, Sweden may not be the country which best exemplifies that kind of welfare state any longer.
In Sweden – often seen as the most progressive of all the Scandinavian welfare states – something has gone wrong. Or, depending on how we interpret things, the country has at least changed direction radically and is headed somewhere else entirely. Once Sweden offered a glimpse of Utopia. It showed that, in a great many policy areas, more equality can result in a win-win scenario. But the engine of improvement has stalled – or, rather, gone into reverse in some ways. The country’s economic performance looks great from the outside. And it is great in many ways. Sweden managed to sail through the global financial crisis in such a way that many of its citizens hardly noticed it. The problem is that the politico-economic model which the country is now following is not sustainable – at least not from a humanistic perspective. And it is very uncertain how hard or how far the country will fall if current trends continue. I will take examples from four crucial welfare sectors – health care, elder care, schools, and law and order – to illustrate what has gone wrong. My conclusion is that, if the current fixation with economistic principles does not give way to humanistic values, future observers will look back on this unique and successful experiment in equality as, at best, an historical parenthesis. At worst, they will see it as a road to hell paved with good intentions.
In the health-care system, the distance between patients and doctors has grown very large. Lengthening queues at the emergency room mean many hours of waiting for treatment, and patients are rarely treated twice by the same doctor even if their condition is very serious. In order to counteract such problems, enormous sums are being spent on building new hospitals. The most prestigious of them all is ‘Nya Karolinska’ in Stockholm. One of the arguments for building a new hospital was that the old Karolinska was too small, and so could not provide proper care for patients. The budget ceiling for the new hospital was originally 14 billion Swedish crowns. Now the cost for the hospital has exceeded 60 billion crowns. Moreover, the new hospital has actually turned out to be smaller than the old one. And parts of it are already falling apart and in need of repairs. Nor does anyone seem to know what the astronomical fees paid out to consultancy firms have been used for. But this is now normal in Sweden. As the Swedish National Audit Office has shown, it is common for large public-infrastructure projects to end up being twice as expensive, or even more, than specified in the original contract. Nor are there any real sanctions against those who bid low to eliminate competitors and then fail to stay within the limits of the budget. Many building contractors get a blank check. But not everyone does. Nurses, for example, do not.
Swedish hospitals in many cities are getting a facelift, and new buildings are being added to them. And the new or fixed parts are often impressive – on the outside. Inside, however, emergency patients must be prepared to wait many hours to see a doctor. The older you are, the more time you have to spend at the emergency-care unit. And the staff, one by one, are ‘hitting the wall’ due to high stress levels. Nurses and midwives at hospitals in Sweden work at such a frantic pace that they have stopped bringing their lunch to work, simply because they have no time to rest. Even at cancer-treatment wards, patients are not receiving humane treatment. Moreover, it seems hospital managers get away with treating their employees with contempt, because there are few alternative job markets in Sweden where conditions are much better. Doctors and nurses spend their vacations catching up on back-logged journals. Austerity measures are applied in an amazingly short-sighted way. Today’s management models dictate that only the exact minimum number of doctors and nurses be employed. The effect of this is that, as soon as the work load deviates from the one planned, extra doctors have to be brought in on an overtime basis – for at least double the cost. Many of the nurses and midwives, on the other hand, simply have to work twice as hard. Hence no lunch break. This seems to be happening constantly. In sum: The building contractors get paid. The human beings inside the buildings burn out. And patients with deadly diseases are put on hold.
Then, about two years ago, I noticed something new when I visited an elder-care home. Quite often, people living there were given morphine patches.
Elder care is also understaffed. But people over 80 cannot complain so loudly. They certainly get treatment and a place to stay when they can no longer manage on their own, but far too many get ‘care’ without dignity. A long time ago, I worked briefly in this sector myself. The working conditions were tough then. But now they are even worse. Some employees are monitored like slaves through an app in their smartphone. Then, about two years ago, I noticed something new when I visited an elder-care home. Quite often, people living there were given morphine patches. Some surely needed it, because they were in pain. However, the frequency with which these patches are being distributed should raise concern. It turns out that, in the last ten years, the number of morphine patches distributed to elderly people in Sweden has increased by 100 percent. Clearly, the patches are being used in many cases for something they were not made for. Eyewitness accounts show they are being used to make work demands more ‘manageable’. To make people more manageable. However, giving fentanyl transdermal patches to a person with severe dementia, for example, can be regarded as tantamount to handing out a death sentence. It is mainly people over the age of 80 that get such ‘treatment’. One commonly used product is called ‘Norspan’. Between 2006 and 2015, the use of Norspan increased by over 700 percent. As the brand name suggests, there seems to be something very Nordic about this. According to Nordic folklore, namely, old folks who could no longer ‘keep up’ were simply pushed off a cliff. Morphine patches, it would appear, can be used for senicide.
Schools too are seriously understaffed, and Swedish pupils have been underperforming for a long time now. Well-trained teachers are in high demand. But the job is not an attractive one. Teacher programmes at universities have, on average, one applicant per position. Soon it will likely be less. It has been a very long time since being a teacher in Sweden carried high status. Teachers in both public and private schools need to struggle hard, and many ‘hit the wall’ on account of inhumane working conditions. Too many of them, furthermore, face disorder in the classroom today. Teachers in some areas are insulted by their pupils constantly. Threats are becoming more common, as is serious physical violence against teachers. Between 2012 and 2016, the number of attacks against teachers doubled. At the same time, the school system is the most ‘liberal’ in the world now. It is not just that pupils get away with treating teachers in the terrible ways mentioned. It is also the fact that Sweden allows commercial corporations to establish and operate schools, on the basis of a voucher system. Then, when these companies cut costs (which means fewer teaching hours per pupil), they turn over the resulting profits to their shareholders – including those outside Sweden. This is how Swedish taxes are being used today: to cut down on quality and to send the tax revenues thereby ‘saved’ abroad.
Finally, we need to consider the law-and-order situation in general. The number of violent crimes that are solved in Sweden has declined, by ten percent from 2015 to 2016. Since 2014, the number of sexual crimes reported has risen sharply. The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) conducts surveys on a regular basis about crimes. In 2011, about 1.1 percent of a random sample claimed to have been the victim of a sexual crime. In 2016 it was more than four percent. The trend is alarming. For a while, it seemed, the number of rape crimes that are solved was going up. In 2017, however, the total number of rape crimes which were reported increased so much that there was actually a relative decline in the number that were solved. Furthermore, the people most affected by declining safety are those in low-income areas, especially women. Women in general are severely affected by this decline in law and order. Rape cases in the larger cities in Sweden are not even processed.
However, the main reason why so few crimes are solved does not seem to lie in any lack of personnel in the police force. The problem seems instead to be that too few police are actually working at solving crimes. Officers have to spend much of their time filling out evaluations, managing cumbersome control systems and administrative routines, and adjusting their methods in the face of recurrent campaigns for administrative reform. Efforts to make things more efficient in this sector have somehow had the opposite effect. Individuals are evaluated constantly. Far too seldom, however, is the effect of the many evaluations and consequent changes itself evaluated. Almost never are the full costs of the many evaluations themselves included in the budget. What a paradox!
This is indeed a dark picture of what has happened to the Swedish welfare state. Fortunately, though, not all crimes are increasing. Teachers still manage to muddle through. Likewise nurses, doctors, and caregivers. But in one of the wealthiest countries in the world, our capacity to care for each other is declining. These are not small cracks in the façade. They are fissures that run deep, and the trend has to be broken. People employed in the welfare sector often have no choice but to struggle on when working conditions worsen. But it breaks them over the long run. So-called burn-out syndrome was already a problem in Sweden in 2000. Since then, however, there has been a sixfold (!) increase in the number of people who are on sick leave with this diagnosis. A significant majority among them are women, and the real numbers are most likely larger. Individuals who ‘hit the wall’ also frequently relapse, because they do not get a proper chance to recover, and working conditions remain highly stressful. Some of them, therefore – women in particular again – seek to reduce the pressure by switching to part-time work. That way, perhaps, they can at least cope. As a result, however, the pension they receive upon retirement is significantly lower.
In Sweden today, it seems, physical capital is valued much more highly than people and human capital. Individuals have been transformed into a dispensable and disposable resource. Historically, this has been the rule rather than the exception – but for a while the welfare state was a great exception. But now Sweden is going in another direction. To be sure, systems for cost control have worked to limit the expenses of the state. Rigorous budgetary controls make cuts in public provision mandatory. However, services do not improve thereby. Total costs are kept in check. But within the public sector, buildings and maintenance somehow always win out over salaries and personnel costs. How did a great idea like ‘welfare for all’ turn into something so dysfunctional?
The Swedish state has changed dramatically over the last thirty years, due to the spread of management ideology, the introduction of reforms for decentralization, the embrace of competition and marketization, and the instituting of vouchers to ensure individual choice throughout the welfare sector.
New Public Management and economism have broken the welfare contract
As Sweden prepares for its election, the populists are gaining ground. It is tempting, of course, to argue that is their exploitation of issues relating to immigration that is the sole reason for the trend. Several EU states have clearly handled the refugee crisis so badly that the space for political reform at the national level has been reduced, and the prospects for a deepening of the Union’s federal structures have been damaged. Segregation and certain types of crimes have increased in connection with immigration flows. However, the focus on immigration as the cause of the crisis for social democracy and the welfare state is fallacious.Sweden serves as a good illustration of how bigger forces have been undermining the welfare state for a long time – since long before the immigration crisis of 2015.
A more credible answer to the question of where the paradigm shift comes from is ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). The Swedish state has changed dramatically over the last thirty years, due to the spread of management ideology, the introduction of reforms for decentralization, the embrace of competition and marketization, and the instituting of vouchers to ensure individual choice throughout the welfare sector. Sweden, it turns out, is likely the country in Europe which has embraced NPM reforms the most. During the 1980s and early 1990s, both the left and the right in Sweden championed NPM. They did this in unison – so much so, in fact, that the introduction of NPM was never even an issue in election campaigns.
Admittedly, some reforms along these lines have doubtless been useful. Reforms were certainly needed in the 1970s and early 1980s, when fiscal control was clearly lacking. The idea was to cut costs and to use evaluations to improve efficiency. But the stress on efficiency has entailed a one-sided focus on budgets, and created perverse side effects. Thus we see the effects mentioned above: understaffed schools and hospitals; police officers busy with numerous tasks other than crime-fighting; and the like. In its efforts to mimic the market, moreover, the state has gotten intimately involved with market actors. This creates serious problems for accountability. Such problems have not been lost on several scholars of public administration, among them Michael Power, author of The Audit Society – Rituals of Verification, who has shown how NPM can and often does pervert incentive structures. In the leadership of most political parties, however, NPM remains hugely popular. It finds far less favour, however, among the population at large. Thus, it remains hugely popular among public officials, high-ranking political leaders, and private entrepreneurs in charge of welfare services – even as some 60 percent of Swedes oppose profit-making in the welfare sector. None of the large parties have any intention of changing this. Our political parties, then, are clearly out of sync. In their refusal to accommodate voter preferences at all, they have shown they are willing to sacrifice democratic principles. Their alliance with the capitalists is more important than their duty to the voters. The problem here also goes beyond deficiencies in the details of how NPM works.
At the core of the problem we find a kind of economistic thinking, which has established itself as a ‘supra-ideology’. The latter term was used by Herbert Tingsten, when he described democracy as the common overarching ideology in western Europe after the Second World War. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, economism has become so dominant as even to replace democracy as a supra-ideology. The animating idea of the EU was once to promote peace and democracy in Europe. Then economism took over. The same goes at the level of the individual nations – in Sweden, for example. No matter what values and issues are being discussed, the economistic perspective always seems to enjoy precedence. Humanistic concerns come second. And this is a tragedy. People working in a political system, such as a state, may have motives of severalkinds to do their job. They may be animated by virtues, ideals, ideas, mores, ideologies, etc. These can induce people to ‘do the right thing even when no one is looking’. In some cases, however, the results proved costly or even dysfunctional. NPM then entered the picture as a possible solution.
It certainly looked good when it was first introduced. And it really did seem to offer solutions to a variety of problems. For a while. However, the reforms introduced were all based on one common idea: Homo Economicus, or Economic Man. This is the view that people are guided by their self-interest, and that such self-interest takes the form largely of the pursuit of economically measurable rewards – for oneself. Here we behold another striking paradox. Even if people understood this to be an oversimplification of human behaviour, and even if they realized individuals do not behave in such a one-dimensional way, the idea of Homo Economicus began to reshape reality in its own image. People who were fired by altruism, and others whose motivations were not solely based in monetary or material gain for themselves, were essentially force-fed with the idea that only incentives appealing to self-interest counted. Other things may have motivated them to begin with, but they had to adapt to the new order. They learned that thinking and acting in accordance with the prescribed model was the only way they would be rewarded at work at all. And so people’s values changed, as did their whole worldview. They became individualists of a very narrow kind. Thus were we changed by a theoretical assumption, in such a way that our behaviour now only seems to confirm it. The circle is closed.
It is not clear what exactly it will take to change this. At the local level we see some healthy counter-reactions. In Gothenburg, for example, citizens have long tired of cartel-like behaviour in connection with costly infrastructure projects. Many of that city’s residents have clearly felt that ‘it really does not matter who you vote for’. As a result, a new party focused mainly on prioritizing people over physical capital has been quite successful, with polls showing support for it at around eighteen per cent. Targeting exactly this discrepancy between the value ascribed to people and that ascribed to things, they have not just succeeded in gaining support on an impressive scale and without resorting to populist appeals. It seems they have also captured voters who would otherwise ‘bleed’ to the Sweden Democrats.
But changes in mind-sets are needed at the national level too – and on a much larger scale. Even if the right things are done, it will take a long time to separate the state from the market forces and market actors with which it has gotten so entangled – both ideologically and in practice. But two things are certain.
As I see it, the welfare state and the predatory corporate state coexist in Sweden now, but they clash with one another – and it is the latter which is gaining ground.
First, the ‘welfare state’ was a valuable concept, with empirical and theoretical relevance, for describing Sweden up to some point in the 1980s or early 1990s. But since then, beneath the facade of a progressive state, realities on the ground have changed so radically as to make a new term necessary. The ‘predatory corporate state’ might be a good name, in view of how the state and commercial interests work together, and how they view citizens more and more as an economic and disposable resource. As I see it, the welfare state and the predatory corporate state coexist in Sweden now, but they clash with one another – and it is the latter which is gaining ground.
Second, extremist movements are on the rise in much of the Western world. In Sweden, for example, the far right has grown substantially. There is no excuse or justification for embracing such a viewpoint. For a long time, however – and this is still the case – the rising support for such groups has been seen as taking place in some kind of vacuum. Explanations of this kind divert attention, I believe, from what has paved the way for such movements. Conditions on the ground, such as those discussed here, are what has generated strong support for the populists. This applies both in Sweden and in many other countries, including those (such as Trump’s America) where social protection has long been skimpy and minimal. The result of the UK referendum on Brexit is likely explicable in such terms as well. Any effort to turn things around – to shift developments on to a more humane track – must involve a clearer separation between the state and the market, together with a strategy to recapture the political initiative from the populists, the technocrats, and the devotees of economism. Given their traditional normative perspective, social democrats would seem a natural candidate to do this. Today, however, that is unlikely, given the form that social democratic policies have taken in practice for some time now. And the far left, while targeting the right problems in its campaign rhetoric, has no credible solutions to offer. It is still essentially communist in how it thinks about the state and economics. Indeed, it is only matched by SD in its populism in such matters. As a matter of fact, a shift of the kind needed could come just as well from conservatives or liberals of various kinds. Why would it not be in their interest to produce a credible and non-populist plan showing how the staff at elder-care homes could be allowed to share a cup of coffee with residents?
Sten Widmalm is Professor in Political Science at Uppsala University. Many thanks to Peter Mayers for proofreading and giving constructive comments and suggestions for this text.
 Markus Uvell. 2018. Bakslaget – radikalt etablissemang, konservativa medborgare. Stockholm: Timbro.
 The kind of welfare state I refer to here is one which taxes the income of its citizens heavily and which spends a lot of money, but which also deliverssocial services like schools, hospitals, childcare, elder care, and so on. In fact, in large parts of northern Europe and among social scientists in general, the term ‘welfare state’ is often used in a positive sense – quite contrary, for example, to the connotations the word often has in the US.
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 The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet BRÅ), https://www.bra.se/brott-och-statistik/statistik-utifran-brottstyper/valdtakt-och-sexualbrott.html
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 Iva Horvatovic. ”Polisen hinner inte med våldtäkter på grund av mord.” 2017. SVT Nyheter. Published 12 September. Updated:13 September 2017. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/polisen-hinner-inte-med-valdtakter-pa-grund-av-mord
 See Malin Roos. 2017. “Sexdubblering i antal sjuka på grund av stress”, Expressen, June 15. https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/sexdubblering-i-antal-sjuka-pa-grund-av-stress/
 Gerhard Hammerschmid, Steven Van de Walle, Rhys Andrews, and Philip Bezes (eds.) 2016. Public Administration Reforms in Europe – The View from the Top. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
Ahlbäck Öberg, Shirin, and Sten Widmalm. 2013. ”NPM på svenska.” In Patientens pris, edited by Maciej Zaremba. Stockholm: Weyler förlag.
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 Tingsten, Herbert. (1945) 1960. Demokratiens Problem. Stockholm: Aldus, Bonniers.
 Ahlbäck Öberg, Shirin, and Sten Widmalm. 2016. ”Om att göra rätt även när ingen ser på.” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift118 (1).